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Abstract
In this paper, I examine what I refer to as the spike doctrine, which is
the generally held belief in neuroscience that information in the brain is
encoded by sequences of neural action potentials. I present the argument
that specific neurochemicals, and not spikes, are the elementary units of
information in the brain. I outline several predictions that arise from this
interpretation, relate them to results in the current research literature,
and show how they address some open questions.
1 Introduction: The Spike Doctrine
One of the fundamental achievements that established neuroscience as a vi-
able and distinct discipline was the development of the neuron doctrine, which
states that neurons are anatomically distinct cells that serve as the basic com-
putational units in the brain. In truth, this was not the original statement of
the doctrine, which was originally more concerned with the discrete versus con-
tinuous character of the brain’s neural network, but this is how it is generally
regarded in its present form [4]. Still, it is a concept that continues to evolve
[15].
Folded into the current interpretation of the neuron doctrine is what I will
call the spike doctrine, which is something so firmly ingrained in current neuro-
scientific theory that one often finds some version of it on or near the first page
of any text on the subject.1 A rather poetic statement of this doctrine is given
by Rieke, et al. [33], who write:
[Our] perception of the world is constructed out of the raw data sent
to our brains by our sensory nerves, and in each case these data
come in the same standard form—as sequences of identical voltage
pulses called action potentials or “spikes.” . . . Spike sequences are
the language for which the brain is listening, the language the brain
uses for its internal musings, and the language it speaks as it talks
to the outside world.
1The reader is referred to, for instance, [9, 10, 14, 17, 22, 33, 37, 42] among many others.
1
ar
X
iv
:1
30
4.
20
18
v2
  [
q-
bio
.N
C]
  2
 Ju
n 2
01
3
A somewhat more prosaic treatment comes from Gerstner and Kistler [14],
who write:
We think of a neuron primarily as a dynamic element that emits
output pulses whenever the excitation exceeds some threshold. The
resulting sequence of pulses or “spikes” contains all the information
that is transmitted from one neuron to the next.
A second part of the doctrine concerns the assumptions that are made re-
garding how these spikes encode information about the world. Again, from
Gerstner and Kistler [14]:
Since all spikes of a given neuron look alike, the form of the action
potential does not carry any information. Rather, it is the number
and the timing of spikes which matter.
They go on to summarize the doctrine quite explicitly: “The action potential is
the elementary unit of signal transmission.”
Almost without exception, every theoretical effort to consider cognition and
information processing in the brain is built upon this doctrine. It is the aim of
this paper to examine this long-held belief in neuroscience and, ultimately, to
begin building a case for overturning it.
2 Why Spikes?
2.1 The Electric Brain
With the proper equipment, it would not take one long to determine that some-
thing peculiar is going on inside the brain. Indeed, the brain is the exemplar
structure of the body electric. Although one does find steady electrical signals
issuing from the heart, the brain is unique in its level of galvanic chatter. It is
perhaps no wonder that the prevailing belief is that crackling inside this tangle
of electrical activity is the very language of thought.
In addition to seeming very special and brain-like, this electrical activity also
has the advantage of being relatively easy to measure, at least at a coarse level.
Monitoring the activity of an individual cell is much more difficult, however. It
currently requires getting into the skull and placing an electrode in or near the
cell of interest, a procedure typically reserved for certain surgical patients and
hapless laboratory animals.
That neurons produce any measurable electrical activity at all seems a minor
miracle in itself. Neurons do not use electricity the same way a household
appliance does. Rather, neurons regulate the flow and concentration of charged
ions on either side of their cell membranes. The difference in charge between
the inside of the cell and the outside is known as a membrane potential, and a
spike is a rapid shift in this potential that propagates down the length of the
nerve. The arrival of a spike at the end of the neuron triggers the release of
stored chemical neurotransmitters.
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Figure 1: An example of a 3D network. Each red point is a node, which would
serve as a “neuron” in an ANN. Information is exchanged via the connections
(edges) between the nodes, governed by a connection strength described by the
weight, w. Image generated from code found in [18].
The most immediate effect these chemicals have is to open gated ion channels
on the postsynaptic neuron, thereby changing its membrane potential. Caus-
ing the influx of positive ions increases the cell’s chance of firing a spike (in
which case the responsible neurotransmitter is called excitatory), and causing
the influx of negative ions decreases it (in which case the transmitter is called
inhibitory). In short, by releasing neurotransmitters, one cell can influence
whether the cells it is signaling fire spikes of their own.
This easy-to-state relationship, highly influenced by the early work of Mc-
Culloch and Pitts [30], is at the core of artificial neural network (ANN) research,
much of the theory for which can be summarized in the single equation
yi = f
 n∑
j=1
wijxj − θi
 . (1)
Here yi, the “state” of neuron νi, is determined by applying some (often non-
linear) function f to the collected states, xj , of the n neurons connected to it
multiplied by the “strength” of those connections, represented by the weight
term wij . The θi term describes the threshold for the neuron νi [16].
2 An ex-
ample of a general network—although not an ANN—is shown in Figure 1.
In some models, the state of the neuron may simply be 1 or 0, which could
be considered to correspond to whether it is firing or not. The state can also
2Not all ANN models use the exact form of equation (1) to compute neural states, but
the vast majority—and virtually all simple models—use it or a close relative. It should also
be noted that the output, y, would be an input, x, to some other neuron unless it was the
member of the network’s output layer.
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be a firing rate or even a membrane potential. A considerable portion of ANN
research, which we will refer to by the more general term connectionism, does
not concern itself too much with biological realism, so the “neuron” states do not
have to correspond to anything an actual cell has to deal with. Even in these
cases, though, some of the biological language is preserved. So, if a neuron
is considered to be inhibitory, its connection weight to postsynaptic cells will
generally be negative; it will be positive in the excitatory case.
Artificial neural networks are interesting objects, and they can be “trained”
to perform a variety of important tasks, from pattern recognition and classifica-
tion to function approximation. Further, it has been shown that certain finite
neural networks—in fact, neural networks with less than one-millionth the num-
ber of neurons in the human brain—can simulate a universal Turing machine
[38]. In essence, this means that such a network—given enough time—can com-
pute anything that can be computed.3 Other research has suggested enormous
computational potential for spiking neural network models.4
Artificial neural networks “learn” to perform certain functions through a
training regimen whose purpose is to alter the values of the synaptic weights,
w, until the inputs to the network produce outputs that are as close as possible
to target outputs.5 This is one example—of many—where an ANN deviates
from biological realism, since a real neural network cannot be expected to have
access to whatever the “target” outputs are supposed to be.
Even so, the basic principle of learning for an ANN seems to apply in the
brain. Synaptic plasticity, a molecularly and genetically mediated process that
adjusts the strength of connections between neurons, is thought to be the chief
component behind learning and memory [20].
2.2 The Neural Code
Current theory states that spikes pulsing through the nerve network in the brain
represent and convey information, and the adjustment of the connections be-
tween nerves gives rise to memory, learning, problem solving, and everything
else that makes us intelligent. The manner in which this information is rep-
resented by spike sequences is often referred to as the neural code. There is
considerable debate as to the exact form of this code, especially with regard
to whether the precise timing of individual spikes or the average rate of spikes
carries the necessary information [5, 10, 33].
Temporal coding, rate coding, and population coding (which takes into ac-
count the collective activity of multiple neurons6) are the prevailing theories for
how information is encoded in the brain. Indeed, if information is conveyed by
3A Turing machine is not an actual machine but rather a theoretical construct that serves
to illustrate what computers can and cannot do.
4See, for instance, [27].
5These input-output pairs used for learning are often referred to as the training set, and
the method by which the weights are adjusted is referred to as a learning rule.
6Population coding is a term that can technically include correlation coding, in which
information is encoded by comparing the timing of one neuron’s spike sequence to another’s.
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spikes, then the neural code must be described by at least one of these meth-
ods. But, as there is at least some evidence to support each of these methods,
deciding among them is difficult.
It is worth pointing out that rate and population coding have enjoyed con-
siderable success, particularly in vision research and the study of perception and
action. For instance, the “preferences” of individual neurons for highly specific
visual features seem to be indicated by their firing rate, and calculations using
the concerted activity of a small population of neurons in a monkey’s motor
cortex can predict its arm movements with high accuracy [13].
Researchers who believe that spike sequences encode information in the brain
have a fair amount of encouraging evidence on their side. As we have covered
earlier, neural spiking is mediated by various neuroactive chemicals. Clearly,
then, if the information is encoded in action potentials, then it must be the case
that these chemicals function in the service of the spikes. We will soon examine
the possibility that it is the other way around.
3 Why Not Spikes?
3.1 The Brain as Statistician
Most experiments that investigate the neural code do so by monitoring the
response of a certain cell to a controlled stimulus. Let us say that over some
interval of time, we make a note of the times at which the cell fires a spike. We
can denote this sequence by {ti}. This gives us information not only about the
precise timing of each spike but also about the average firing rate, which we can
obtain by counting all the elements in the sequence and dividing by the amount
of time we were monitoring the cell.
Scientists looking for the neural code would like to identify P [{ti}|s(t)], which
describes the conditional probability of forming the spike sequence {ti} given
that the stimulus s(t) has occurred.7 The neuron, however, has essentially the
opposite problem, as it would like to evaluate P [s(t)|{ti}], which describes the
probability of a certain stimulus given the spike train [33].
These probabilities are related by a classic result known as Bayes’s theorem,
which takes the form
P [s(t)|{ti}] = P [{ti}|s(t)]P [s(t)]
P [{ti}] . (2)
This result states that the probability of a particular stimulus given a specific
observation (the spike train, {ti}) is proportional to the probability of the ob-
servation given the stimulus—which makes intuitive sense—but it is controlled
by the ratio of the probability of the stimulus, P [s(t)], to the probability of the
observed spike train, P [{ti}].
7Phrasing the neural code in terms of probabilities may seem like equivocation. However,
those looking for a more definite, prescriptive approach should bear in mind that a probabilistic
statement can also encompass “certain” events of probability 1.
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Now, while a neuron may conceivably know what its own response history
is, which would allow it to evaluate the response probability, where does its
knowledge of the stimulus probability come from? The implication is that even
if one has complete knowledge of the scheme for encoding, anything short of an
exact prescription for this encoding results in uncertainty when decoding, that
is, when interpreting an observation. Much current theory seeks to address this
uncertainty.
3.2 An Explosion of Uncertainty
The vast majority of neural network models assume that when a neuron fires,
the message that it has fired is sent faithfully. This is not the same as saying
that some models do not assume there to be noise in the system. The difference
is that the noise in those models is phrased in terms of random nerve activity
that does not encode anything meaningful. But there is another form of “noise”
in real neural systems that may prove more troublesome.
Before we develop this point, however, let us return to the connectionist
paradigm for a moment. A neuron’s spiking pattern is influenced—caused, we
might say—by the spiking patterns of “upstream” neurons that connect to it
based on how strong those connections are. With this in mind, another way of
writing equation (2) is
P [s(t)|{ti}] = P [s(t), {ti}]∑
x(t) P [{ti}|x(t)]P [x(t)]
, (3)
where x(t) is a time-varying vector that collects all the spike sequences of the
upstream neurons. It looks considerably different from the expression in equa-
tion (2), especially since it now invokes the joint probability P [s(t), {ti}], which
considers the pairing of all possible stimuli and responses. It also requires that
we consider the response {ti} in relation to all possible inputs x(t). But if the
rule for the response is as straightforward as equation (1), this new requirement
need not cause too much additional difficulty for the cell. That is, it need not
unless P [x(t)], the output of the upstream neurons, is itself uncertain.
This turns out to be the case. Although there is some evidence to suggest
that changes in one neuron’s membrane potential can have direct influence on a
neighboring neuron’s potential, this cannot be employed as a general method for
neural signaling. After all, neurons routinely communicate with other neurons
far outside the influence of the extraordinarily weak electric and magnetic fields
that they generate. The only way for one neuron to know that another neuron
has fired is to receive a chemical signal from it.8
Neurons do not reliably release neurotransmitter with each spike. Not only
does the transmitter release probability vary widely among neurons, this proba-
bility is also variable for each neuron and can change over time [3]. One estimate
8An exception occurs in so-called electrical synapses, which communicate via direct ion
exchange through gap junctions. The current viewpoint, supported by various models, is that
gap junctions help enforce synchronous firing among oscillating neurons [23].
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is that, on average, synapses have a transmitter release probability of about 30
percent [26]. If we replace x(t), the upstream spiking record, with ξ(t), the
firing indications that our neuron actually receives, then equation (3) becomes
P [s(t)|{ti}] = P [s(t), {ti}]∑
x(t)
∑
ξ(t) P [{ti}|x(t)]P [x(t)|ξ(t)]P [ξ(t)]
, (4)
which introduces a tremendous amount of additional uncertainty (and effort)
into the problem. Indeed, establishing the new term P [x(t)|ξ(t)], which can be
interpreted as a complete description of the release probabilities of all cells in
a neural circuit, is itself a task almost on par with the difficulty of the original
signal-interpretation problem stated in equation (2).
The variability in transmitter release would seem to force us to discard tem-
poral coding as a viable general method for representing information in the
brain. And, although rate coding remains a possibility—since each input neu-
ron’s average observed spiking rate would be scaled by its transmitter-release
probability—it would seem to require that each neuron have a complete and up-
to-date account of the release probabilities for the synapses it shares with up-
stream neurons. Our neuron’s signal-identification problem has become fraught
with ambiguity.
4 Signals in the Cellular Domain
4.1 Neuroactive Molecules
We have already discussed one role of neurotransmitters in signaling among
cells, namely the manner in which they influence the downstream firing of action
potentials. Neurotransmitters lie within a broader class of neuroactive chem-
icals that include chemicals known as neuromodulators, which, as the name
implies, modulate a cell’s response to other chemical signals. Neuromodulators
include neuropeptides, which are chains of amino acids; certain gasses dissolved
in the intercellular medium, such as nitric oxide; and some products of fatty-acid
metabolism.
For a chemical to be classified as a neurotransmitter, it must satisfy certain
criteria [13, 44]:
1. It must be manufactured by the neuron and released into the synapse in
response to an action potential.
2. It must induce effects on the postsynaptic cell, mediated by transmitter-
specific receptors.
3. There must be a mechanism for inactivating or removing the substance
from the synapse after release.
4. Experimental application of the substance to nervous tissue must produce
effects similar to those induced by the naturally occurring transmitter.
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We are familiar with some of the effects described in the second point, as we
know that some neurotransmitters are excitatory (the most common of which
is glutamate) and some are inhibitory (the most common of which is γ-amino
butyric acid, or GABA). The receptors for these chemicals control gates that
regulate ion flow, and such receptors are collectively called ionotropic.
There is a second class of receptors, however, known as metabotropic re-
ceptors. Once triggered, these receptors initiate complex chemical cascades
that generate additional signals within the neuron [44]. The ultimate recipi-
ent of these intracellular signals is the neural genome, as genes are selectively
expressed via transcription factors assembled and activated in response to the
cascade [39].
4.2 The Genomic Response
Like almost all cells in the body, every neuron has a complete copy of the genome
in its nucleus. And, also like other cells, only a small fraction of the genes within
each neuron’s copy of the genome are expressed at any time [26].
It is well known that during development, cells differentiate by expressing a
specific subset of genes, regulated by a chemical process that is not completely
understood. One pattern of gene expression leads a young cell toward a fate
of bone, for instance, while another pattern leads to brain. As gene expression
controls not only certain housekeeping duties of the cell but also the products
it makes, we would expect neurons that manufacture, say, dopamine to show
a different pattern of gene expression than a neuron that manufactures acetyl-
choline. This is indeed true, but the differences among neural gene-expression
patterns do not end there.
Selective gene expression does not stop after development, after all. Perhaps
the most interesting example in neurons is known as the immediate-early gene
(IEG) response. This is a specific pattern of gene expression in the neural
genome in response to a stimulus, a reaction so specific as to have been referred
to as the “genomic action potential” in the literature [8].
Much recent work has demonstrated this effect in the zebra finch in re-
sponse to the vocalizations of its fellow finches [8, 12, 45]. Further, this genomic
response ceases once the vocalization becomes familiar [12]. A number of theo-
ries suggest that this response is necessary for memory consolidation of specific
events, but it has also been proposed that the response instead improves the
efficiency of memory formation by altering the cell’s state to better encode tran-
sient, but similar, experiences into long-term memory [8].
It is known that gene expression and subsequent protein synthesis play a role
in memory formation, and inhibiting protein synthesis has been shown to greatly
interfere with learning [19]. One could interpret the role of protein synthesis in
memory formation from a strict connectionist viewpoint and insist that it be
in the service of the long-term potentiation (LTP), or strengthening, of excita-
tory synapses—namely, adjusting the “weights” among interacting cells. This
strict interpretation is challenged, however, by the finding that inhibiting LTP
at N -methyl-d-aspartate (NMDA) receptors for glutamate does not prevent ex-
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perimental animals from learning certain tasks [13].9 As is often the case in
biology, the reality appears to be far more complex.
Particularly interesting is the way in which the IEG response appears to
be independent of spike activity. For instance, as reviewed in [8], we find the
following phenomena in zebra finches: Songs that have become habituated by
repitition cease to induce a gene response, but this cessation of the gene re-
sponse occurs despite continuing spike activity induced by the stimulus. Songs
of heterospecific and conspecific birds induce similar spiking behavior in the
caudomedial neostriatum, but heterospecific songs induce the IEG only half as
effectively. And singing induces considerable gene activation in a song-control
nucleus in the basal ganglia, but those cells’ firing rates show little to no increase
during singing.
Here, then, we have distinct cellular responses to stimuli that are not distin-
guished by their spiking behavior. It is not at all clear how a strict connectionist
viewpoint could account for these phenomena.
5 The Chemical Vocabulary of Cognition
5.1 A Game of 37 Questions
Imagine that you are given a printout of a neural spike train and are asked to
identify the stimulus that provoked it. What might your answer be?10
If you are a cognitive neuroscientist, you may try to get some additional
information out of your interlocutor. If you learn, for instance, that the cell is
in the occipital lobe, then you can be fairly sure that the stimulus was a visual
signal of some sort. But “a visual signal” is unlikely to be a winning response in
this game, so you still need to know more. If you learn that the cell is from area
V1, then you know a bit more, but still not enough to unequivocally identify
the specific feature of the stimulus that the cell is responding to.
Cognitive neuroscience research is concerned with identifying the neural cor-
relates of behavior, perception, action, emotion, and cognition in general. Much
of that research involves locating specific parts of the brain that appear to be
involved in producing or influencing these phenomena. This research has shown
consistently that certain parts of the brain are specialized for dealing with cer-
tain types of information. It has also been shown that the activity of individual
cells can be highly preferential, responding strongly to very specific types of
stimuli and hardly at all to others [13].
Could identifying a stimulus from a spike train be made possible by identi-
fying the cell that produced the spikes? Could we identify a single cell in the
human brain in a game of 20 questions? If we are restricted to yes-or-no ques-
tions, then we cannot. It would take, on average, log2 10
11 ≈ 37 such questions
to identify an individual cell among the 100 billion in the human brain.
9Blocking LTP does interfere with learning in certain contexts, however.
10The correct answer is: “I have no idea.”
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What is the point of considering such a game? Recall from section 3.2 that
experimental research into the neural code often takes the form of monitoring a
cell’s response to a given stimulus. From the discussion that followed, we know
that during an experiment, we researchers have more information than the cell
does, since we know the stimulus the cell is tasked with identifying. But we also
know something else, namely the specific location of the cell being monitored.
This may seem to be a trivial point, but we must keep in mind that the
additional context we would need for trying to make sense out of a spike train
should also be required by a neuron trying to make sense of a spike train.
After all, although a neuron’s activity can be highly variable, it is limited to
a relatively narrow range, almost never exceeding 1000 Hz (spikes per second)
but usually topping out at about 400 Hz [26]. As Harvey writes [17]:
The origin and targets of nerve fibers establish information and
meaning because signals are similar in all nerve cells. That is, mean-
ing has to do with the particular neural group, while frequency cod-
ing conveys information about the stimulus intensity.
In other words, even if spikes do encode crucial information, neurons should
need to know what neurons are sending them in order to properly interpret
the incoming signals.11 The question becomes how one neuron might tell other
neurons apart.
5.2 Chemical Calling Cards
The brain is a three-pound biochemical laboratory. To date, well over 100
neuroactive chemicals have been identified, and the list continues to grow.12
Neurochemicals are often found in well-defined circuits in the brain, such that
detecting a certain chemical in a signal gives you considerable information as to
the part of the brain from which the signal originated.
We could imagine, then, that the presence or absence of a certain chemical
in a signal could be interpreted as the answer to a yes-or-no question. As we
saw above, it would take about 37 such questions to specify a single cell among
100 billion, meaning that the brain would require the selective, combinatorial
expression of 37 neuroactive chemicals in neurons if it wished to chemically
encode signal provenance. Clearly, with over 100 neurochemicals and counting,
specificity regarding neural signals is a problem the brain need not face.
Anatomical location may not be the main variable of interest to the brain.13
But it is clear that the brain possesses a chemical means for providing additional
11And we would want the method to be completely general, allowing for communication
among any neurons in the brain. If each cell were limited to distinguishing among the 10,000
or so other cells the average neuron has in its network, then it would not be possible to form a
relationship with a cell outside of that network, since any other cell would possess the chemical
“phone number” of one already in the network, so no new infomation could be gained.
12One measure of the pace at which this list is growing is the fact that a popular handbook
of neuroactive chemicals [44] grew by 100 pages in the four years between its first and second
editions.
13Even so, location is important to the brain, as suggested by the multiple location-
preserving maps found in the visual and sensorimotor systems.
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information—or context—for a signal. Since the chemical “messages” associated
with this additional information would undoubtedly outnumber the distinct
types of neurochemicals in the brain, we would expect to see individual cells
express multiple transmitters if specific information is to be encoded chemically.
Indeed, this is the case. Not only is it true that neurons express multiple
transmitters, but they also do so in highly specific patterns [2]. Cotransmission
of neurochemicals is now known to be “the rule rather than the exception” [43],
but the physiological purpose of such cotransmission is not understood and is
currently regarded as an open question [43, 44].
For an example of how chemical context is provided in neural signals, con-
sider replacing the cholinergic neurons in the spinal cord with dopaminergic cells.
A moment’s thought should convince the reader that the behavioral differences
would be obvious, even if the spiking of the impostor cells were experimentally
manipulated to exhibit the same spiking behavior of the original cells. Although
this example is a thought experiment, actual transplantation of neurons from
one brain region to another has produced astounding results.
In one study, serotonergic cells from the mesencephalic raphe´ nucleus ex-
pressed substance P after transplantation to the hippocampus and striatum,but
this effect was not seen upon transplantation to the spinal cord [36].
It is apparent that a specific region of the brain can be indicated by a chem-
ical signature, one that is so influential as to impose itself on foreign cells when
they are introduced. But the brain is not a device running a fixed program.
If specific information is actually encoded by the chemical signature of neural
signals, then it should be necessary that a neuron’s transmitter phenotype be
allowed to change over time. This is also true, and it has been shown that
neurotransmitter phenotypes are highly plastic and can change in response to
activity or environmental signals [2, 6, 31, 43].
5.3 An Expanding Computational Landscape
Chemical signaling is an ancient technique, and it is still employed as the sole
means of communication by our distant, nerveless cousins. Interestingly, “neuro-
transmitters” such as epinephrine, norepinephrine, and serotonin are contained
in sponges, in which there is nary a neuron to be found [2]. These putatively
subordinate chemicals actually evolutionarily predate the cells they are assumed
to serve!
Chemical signaling in the cell is a complex process often referred to as signal
transduction. The interactions in these transduction networks have the ap-
pearance of complex “neural” networks, so the question of their computational
potential is a natural one. Indeed, recent opinion has advocated the investi-
gation of the contribution of these chemical networks to neural computation
[2, 21, 25, 40].
Specific studies have indicated that neural biochemical networks are capable
of decoding complex temporal patterns of input [1]. The kinetics of chemical re-
actions has also been shown to enjoy the same Turing universality demonstrated
for certain neural networks [28]. Further, it is becoming evident that microRNA
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plays an important role in these complex intracellular chemical-genetic networks
[34, 35, 45]. This is particularly remarkable, since microRNA is produced from
noncoding DNA, which makes up well over 90 percent of the human genome
but was once regarded as “junk” [32].
Although the computational complexity of the individual neuron is being
increasingly appreciated by researchers, it remains unorthodox to suggest a role
for biochemical and genetic components in cognitive computation in a manner
that challenges the spike doctrine. That is, the prevailing view still assumes the
basic unit of information signaling to be the action potential, in whose service
the chemical and genetic components are still assumed to function.14 It is only
the expanding repertoire of this servile function that appears to be appreciated.
It has never been claimed in the neuroscience literature that neuroactive
chemicals are unimportant or meaningless. But we are beginning to get some
indication of the deeper role they may play in the representation of informa-
tion in the brain—indeed, a central role. Earlier we considered the function of
neuroactive chemicals as being in the service of spikes. So how might it be the
other way around?
If we believe that information is represented in the brain by patterns of
neural electrical activity, then we must also consider the implications of that
belief. Namely, we should convince ourselves that the evolutionary advent of
the nerve and the action potential coincided with the abandonment of specific
informational roles for biological molecules, molecules that had served a sym-
bolic, informational purpose in our preneural ancestors. We should also ask why
the action-potential paradigm, which clearly must be rich enough to deliver all
the complexity of consciousness, is not used exclusively throughout the body as
a means of information transfer.
The fact is that while all cells in the body communicate chemically—and,
indeed, also possess the genetic instructions and therefore the potential for elec-
trical communication—only the cells that require fast communication outside of
their immediate physical neighborhoods employ the action potential. This sug-
gests that the action potential is simply a means for delivering the message—and
an expensive one at that [24]—but not the message itself.15
Why, then, do studies of spiking seem to provide so much information?
The answer may come from an example drawn from current events. Many news
reports in the years since September 11, 2001, have reported on “chatter” among
14An example of this assumption comes from a 2002 article by Paul Thagard, in which
he writes [italics mine]: “Neural-network computational models typically treat neuronal pro-
cessing as an electrical phenomenon in which the firing of one neuron affects the firing of all
neurons connected to it by excitatory and inhibitory links. . . . The role of neurotransmitters
and other molecules in determining this electrical activity is rarely discussed” [40]. On the
other hand, a recent example of the rare, “unorthodox” view I promote is due to Emanuel Dia-
mant, who discusses the inadequacy of spike trains as the sole means of information transfer,
favoring a biochemical alphabet instead [11].
15Considerations of the cost of encoding information allow us to make certain experimental
predictions. Assuming that it is more costly to express multiple transmitters, we might
expect to see the the variability of transmitter expression—with a tendency toward increasing
cotransmission—change as we progress through a neural circuit.
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cells of terrorists, with the suggestion being that the dynamics of this chatter
indicates something about the threat posed by these cells. This is, of course,
information that is completely independent of the content of that chatter. The
messages, in other words, are unknown; we simply know that more or fewer are
being sent. Such may also be the case with the very different—but even more
mysterious—cells that we have been discussing in this paper.
6 Neural Knowledge
What does a neuron know? As we have discussed earlier, neural responses to
stimuli can be very specific. Some neurons respond preferentially to faces, and
some respond preferentially to specific faces. But does this mean that there is
a neuron in my brain whose job it is to “know,” say, Halle Berry [29]?
Strict connectionists argue against this interpretation [7]. Instead, they
claim, neurons that seem highly specific toward a stimulus only exhibit this
specificity within the context of their networks. Progressively higher-level fea-
tures are extracted at each layer of processing as information about a stimulus
percolates through the network.
If we take a neuron from an ANN and look under the hood, we see only
the machinery described in equation (1). In this regard, all neurons in such a
network are essentially alike and only give the suggestion of meaning by their
activity within the complete network. In short, the connectionist story goes, an
isolated neuron knows nothing.
If membrane potential is the variable of interest in cognitive information
exchange, then it should be held to one of the standards that candidate neu-
rotransmitters are: Namely, the cell should not really care where the voltage
changes are coming from; it should only care that they are there.
Consider the two identical networks shown at the top of Figure 2. One is a
clone of the other, and we will imagine that every last molecular detail is the
same in Network I (NI) as in Network II (NII). Clearly, as these networks are
identical, their responses to the same stimuli will be identical. If we consider
the single neuron at the top of the network to be the output, then we can write
[I(NI) = I(NII)] =⇒ [O(NI) = O(NII)], (5)
which simply states symbolically what we have already said. Namely, if the
information, I, spread over the network is the same, then the output, O, will
be the same also.16
Now let us perform surgery on the second network by removing the connec-
tions leading into the leftmost neuron in the second layer, which we will call
νII5 . We will make up for this insult, though, by connecting this neuron to its
corresponding neuron, νI5, in the intact first network and allow it to copy its
16We cannot claim the converse, however, which says that the same output implies the
same input. Consider a network whose job it is to separate even and odd numbers. The same
output (e.g., “even”) does not imply the same input (e.g., “4”).
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I II
Figure 2: Two identical networks (top) and the same networks following surgery
and “voltage linking” (bottom).
membrane potential dynamics. This arrangement is shown at the bottom of
Figure 2.
If we now present the same stimuli to both networks, it is clear that the
purple neuron in Network II should have identical firing behavior to its coun-
terpart in Network I. After all, we have set it up that way by “voltage linking”
the two networks. If the spike doctrine is correct, then all of the information
in Network I is also present in Network II, since anything that was eliminated
by the surgery is being imported into the network via our connecting device.
Even connection-strength changes, such as one would see in long-term poten-
tiation or depression, only serve to affect the firing behavior and are therefore
also accommodated for in this arrangement.
We have covered earlier (section 5.2) that a neuron’s transmitter pheno-
type can change over time in response to environmental signals. This process,
however, is mediated by intracellular chemical signal transduction and gene ex-
pression, processes that are essentially independent of the membrane voltage.
If the signal we are feeding the networks produces a shift in transmitter pheno-
type in νI5, then even with an exchange of voltage information, ν
II
5 will not show
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the same shift in transmitter phenotype. Since the chemical output from these
corresponding cells no longer matches, there are at least some cases in which
O(NI) 6= O(NII), measured at the output neuron.
Returning to the relation in expression (5), we write its contrapositive, which
is true whenever expression (5) is true,
[O(NI) 6= O(NII)] =⇒ [I(NI) 6= I(NII)], (6)
and we must conclude that in the cases where the outputs do not match—which
is a certainty in at least some cases involving a shift in transmitter phenotype—
the information distributed over the network is not equivalent. The only differ-
ence between the networks is chemical, so the specific chemistry must account
for the missing information.
This result holds irrespective of the method for evaluating the “output” of
the network. That is, one measure could be differences in firing patterns, while
another could be the presence or absence of an IEG response within the cell. In
this case, however, since we are concerned with evaluating the spike doctrine,
we will only look at the spiking behavior of the neuron.
Unless the outputs of the two networks are identical in every way in every
case, then it must be said that the voltage information cannot encode the stim-
ulus but that the chemistry can. And since we can be confident that changing
the chemistry will change the firing behavior of downstream neurons, then we
know the output will not be identical. Regardless of whether this network is
supposed to respond to Halle Berry or the song of a zebra finch, it is clear that
changing the chemistry changes the information distributed over the network.
Notice that earlier I said that the information would be different in some
cases instead of making the stronger claim that it would differ in all cases.
That is because we must allow for the case in which a stimulus is such that
stability within the cell is maintained. That is, some stimuli could conceivably
be passed along without changing the cell’s transmitter phenotype or gene-
expression patterns. In such stable cases, one would obtain all the necessary
information from observing the spike train, assuming that the current state of
the cell were known.
7 Conclusion
It is the position of this paper that a certain “electrical chauvinism” pervades
modern cognitive science, an assumption that may have us looking in the wrong
place in our search for information in the brain. If the main claim of this paper
is correct, then it is the chemistry of the brain, and not the spiking of neurons,
that defines the elementary units of information relevant to cognition. It would
hardly mean, however, that connectionism is dead.
Rather, the cognitive and computational sciences should look forward to
an era of superconnectionism, in which each node of a Turing-universal neu-
ral network contains another Turing-universal network—a massively interacting
chemical-genetic one—with vastly different properties and dynamics.
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Although this does make the modeling landscape considerably more complex,
it redefines the problem in a way that allows us to reconsider the variables of
computational importance in the cognitive system, variables whose very nature
could have profound theoretical implications for the capabilities of the human
brain.
Despite the appearance of additional complexity, there is an elegant simplic-
ity inherent in the brain’s modern application of a chemical alphabet whose first
words were spelled out in primordial pools billions of years ago. To be sure, mod-
eling this molecular language poses a significant challenge. But if the language
the brain speaks is a chemical one—indeed, one having many dialects—then it
is a challenge we must accept.
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